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Abstract A large literature explaining patterns of redistribution makes use of the median
voter theorem. Using a novel approach, this contribution shows that in OECD countries the
decisive voter, determined by the earner who sees her preferred tax rate being implemented,
on average sits around the 50th percentile in the income distribution, although significant
within and between country differences exist. Under the assumption of a lognormal distri-
bution of gross income, we derive the required tax rate to align the observed gross and net
Gini coefficients in OECD countries. This estimated tax rate is compared to the tax rate pre-
ferred by the median income earner, which gives a new index capturing a nation’s deviation
from the median voter position, measured as the difference between the estimated percentile
position of the decisive voter and the 50th percentile position of the median voter. We pro-
vide a comparative overview of this index over time and between countries. We also locate
the positions of alternative versions of the decisive voter, among which following the ‘one
dollar, one vote’ rule, in a Lorenz curve diagram.
Keywords Redistribution · Lognormal distribution · Lorenz curve · Median voter theorem
1 Introduction
Rising levels of income and wealth inequality have recently led a number of authors to won-
der why democracies have been unable to stall this process (e.g. Bonica et al. 2013). Piketty
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(2014, chapters 10 and 14) mentions that despite being a democracy, the Third Republic of
France did not do much to curb rising inequality in the period before World War I. Stan-
dard economic models invoking the median voter theorem (henceforth MVT) predict rising
inequality will be met with increased redistribution, yet faced with empirical evidence ques-
tioning this relation, recent work (e.g. the survey by Harms and Zink 2003) has put forth
arguments claiming the political process may be skewed in favour of special interest groups
(i.e. ‘one-dollar-one-vote’, Karabarbounis 2011) or distorted by institutions hampering the
accountability of elected officials to the majority. Mettler (2011) claims information short-
ages hamper the translation of economic realities into political demands, whereas Mahler
(2008) and Arawatari (2009) argue that skewed and decreasing voter turnout affect the rep-
resentativeness of the electorate. Finally, multi-dimensional party manifestos, logrolling and
coalition formation may give rise to deviations from the median voter rule.
The aim of this contribution is to locate the decisive voter in the income distribution in
OECD nations. Using a new method, under a number of basic assumptions we show where
in the income distribution the decisive voter sits. In our analysis, the decisive voter must be
interpreted as the income earner who sees her most preferred tax rate being realized. Our
approach builds on earlier work testing the validity of median voter theory, yet gives a more
precise definition of the decisive voter compared to previous studies (see e.g. Scervini 2012
who classifies the median voter in between the 40th and the 60th percentile in the income
distribution). Moreover, our positioning of the decisive voter is based on widely used data.
Our point of departure are the Gini coefficients for gross and net incomes from the OECD
Income Distribution database (OECD 2015), which cover 32 countries for the period 1974–
2012. If gross income is lognormally distributed, the country and year specific parameters
of the lognormal distribution of income can be derived from the Gini coefficients and GDP
per capita. We derive the optimal labour supply using the methodology from Roemer et al.
(2003), giving the distribution of wages and labour supply and the formula for the tax rate
and the lump sum transfer. We show that the preferred proportional tax rate is dependent on
one’s earnings capacity and identify the decisive voter as the one whose preferred tax rate is
equal to the empirically estimated tax rate. Given the derived distribution for wages, we can
locate the percentile position of the decisive voter. We find the decisive voter sits on average
around the 50th percentile in the income distribution, with significant differences within and
between countries.1 We provide a comparative overview of these differences and pitch our
outcomes against the predictions made by the MVT.
Assessing the position of the decisive voter in the income distribution requires a the-
oretical framework which is able to derive preferences for taxation, taking into account
heterogeneity in wages and labour supply disincentives of taxes and transfers. Our approach
is in line with theMVT subsumed under the Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-Richard model (hence-
forth RRMR, see Meltzer and Richard 1981), in which rising inequality in gross income
increases the distance between the median earner and mean earner, increasing the desired
level of redistribution by the median voter. This mechanism steers how changes in gross
income inequality translate into net income inequality. According to the MVT, the decisive
voter or median voter is the median earner under the assumptions that policy alternatives
1We applied the same model to the more comprehensive SWIID database and found that the decisive voter
on average sits at the 60th percentile. However, as Jenkins (2015) has convincingly shown and two referees
remarked, there are serious shortcomings in using the SWIID database for our purposes, particularly because
of the imputation of Gini coefficients for (mostly) developing countries for which data are missing.
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can be situated along a one-dimensional political spectrum and that voters themselves have
single-peaked preferences. Since we focus only on the gross and net income distribution, the
mediating tax-and-transfer system is in line with a one-dimensional policy space in which
voters have single-peaked preferences with respect to the parameters of the tax-and-transfer
system.
Our approach has advantages and limitations. The most important advantage is that using
only easily accessible statistics such as Gini coefficients, GDP per capita and government
consumption as a share of GDP, our model provides an estimate of the position of the deci-
sive voter. Second, we provide a way to include in-kind, non-cash public provision of goods
such as public education in the model as one component of redistribution, alongside cash
transfers. Third, we can precisely locate several hypothetical decisive voters in a Lorenz
curve diagram, e.g. if the ‘one dollar, one vote’ rule applies, or the ‘one man, one vote’ rule,
or when voters are myopic, solely focusing on net income and disregarding the disutility of
labour. There are also some limitations to our approach. First, due to data limitations, we
use the same labour supply elasticity for all OECD countries. With better data, for instance
micro data including wage rates and working hours, the labour supply elasticity can be
estimated for specific countries and years. Second, our assumption that gross income is log-
normally distributed does not adequately describe the distribution of income at the right tail
of high incomes (Singh and Maddala 1976). Although we are aware that the lognormal-
ity assumption has its limitations, it must be said that the high incomes are generally also
underrepresented in surveys. A more serious shortcoming is that because the parameters
of the lognormal distributions are derived from GDP per capita and the net and gross Gini
coefficients, the resulting gross and net income distributions will be imperfectly mimicking
the real distributions at the lower end of the income distribution.2 The assumption of log-
normality to model the income distribution is frequently made, e.g. by Chotikapanich et al.
(1997), Dikhanov and Ward (2002), Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009) and Van Zanden
et al. (2014). Third, we assume the tax-and-transfer system can be described by the com-
bination of a flat earnings tax and a uniform lump sum grant, while in reality there are a
variety of taxes, ranging from wealth to capital income, VAT and excise taxes with differ-
entiated rates, and a variety of welfare benefits, ranging from social assistance to housing
benefits. Although capital income as part of GDP per capita is included in our parameter
estimation, we abstract from capital (income) in our analytical model. Fourth, our estimates
pertain only to countries generally classified as democratic, while results may differ for
non-democratic nations which are not subject to the constraint that ‘one man, one vote’ has
on the outcomes of the political process. Our findings are however indicative of the fact that
even in these democratic nations the median income earner does not always coincide with
the voter who sees her preferred level of redistributive taxation being realized.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our theoretical model and the
relation between preferred tax rates and wages. Section 3 provides information about the
data used, the derivation of the lognormal distributions, the estimation of parameters and
the analytical expressions of the percentile position of the decisive voter. We also provide
a Lorenz curve diagram with the positions of the mean and median earners and several
decisive voter positions depending on whether ‘one man, one vote’ or ‘one dollar, one vote’
applies. Section 4 contains the results. The final section summarizes and concludes.
2For instance, due to statutory minimum wages and the prevailing social benefit levels, there will be many
more incomes at just these income levels than under the lognormal distributions.
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2 Theoretical framework
As is customary in the public economics literature, e.g. in the seminal article of Meltzer and
Richard (1981), we model tax-and-transfer schemes by a proportional tax with tax rate t
and transfers f . While in reality tax and social security systems are complex, Roemer et al.
(2003: 553) show for a subset of countries similar to ours such an assumption of affineness is
suitable, as it ‘is a very good description of the effective tax regime data for all the countries
that we examine’. We assume f consists of both a lump sum income transfer component c
and a public good component g. Heterogeneity is achieved by allowing individuals’ wage
rate (w) and labour supply (L) to differ. We use the same utility function as in Roemer et al.
(2003), where utility is increasing in net disposable income (y) and decreasing in labour
supply:
U(y, L) = y − αL1+1/η (1)
with η the wage elasticity of labour supply and α the parameter reflecting the disutility of








with αˆ = α (1 + 1 / η). We assume a balanced budget implying f = t x¯, with x¯ representing
mean gross income which using Eq. 2 can be stated as:


















w1+η − g. The
revenue-maximizing tax rate tmax, which is optimal from a Rawlsian social justice perspec-
tive3 is the one that maximizes f (or c, if g is exogenous). Maximizing Eq. 3 with respect
to t gives tmax = 1 / (1 + η).
To find the preferred tax rate ti of an individual with wage rate wi , given the government
balanced budget constraint, the indirect utility function, obtained by substituting Eqs. 2 and
3 into 1, is differentiated with respect to t . This gives the relation between one’s preferred






i − (1 + η)w1+η
(4)
depicted in Fig. 1, for different labour supply elasticities. For higher values of η, the revenue
maximizing tax rate 1/(1 + η) shifts to the left. Since the preferred tax rate is positive for




will choose a positive tax rate, which is higher, the lower the labour supply elasticity.
Using Eq. 4, as the first derivative of t with respect to w is negative, the higher one’s
wage rate becomes, the lower the preferred tax rate will be. The first derivative of t with
3It is the preferred tax rate for those with zero earning capacity, because it maximizes the lump sum transfer.






Fig. 1 The relationship between the preferred tax rate and earnings capacity. Median preferred tax rates are
given for three different wage elasticities of labour supply
respect to w1+η is positive, so given one’s wage rate, the higher the wages economy-wide,
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. (5)
We can rewrite Eq. 4, giving the wage rate as a function of the preferred tax rate:
wi =
[
1 − ti (1 + η)





Inserting our estimates of tax rates tˆ that align observed country- and year-specific gross
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In the introduction, we already gave a limitative list of reasons why the observed tax rate
may diverge from the one expected under MVT. Here we want to add another possibility,
namely that the voter is not maximizing utility U but net income y, which analogous to
Eqs. 5 and 6 results in a preferred tax rate:
t ′i =
(1 + η)w1+ηi − w1+η
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Fig. 2 Lorenz curves for the USA in 2012. The solid line represents the gross distribution with μ = 10.34,
σ = 0.97 and G = 0.51; the dashed line represents the net distribution with μn = 10.37, σn = 0.72 and
Gn = 0.39
Since the ratio wˆ′D(tˆ)/wˆD(tˆ) is below unity, the percentile position of this ‘myopic’ deci-
sive voter, denoted by Py in the income distribution will thus be lower than P , corresponding
to the percentile position of wˆD (see also Fig. 2).
3 Data and method
In order to locate the decisive voter wˆD by country and year, we need information on the
wage distribution and imposed tax rate in a country. We assume that income follows a log-
normal distribution. Compared to more complex distributions with two or more parameters,
the lognormality assumption may bias our estimates of both mean income and dispersion of
income upwards (McDonald 1984). Combining data from the OECD Income Distribution
database (OECD 2015) on market or gross income Gini coefficients4 (G) and post-tax-and-
transfer or net Gini (Gn) with GDP per capita (in current international dollars at PPP) data
from the World Bank (2015), we can estimate the parameters of the lognormal distribution
of gross and net income. For cases with missing data for GDP or population, we standardize
GDP per capita to 1000.5
4Our gross and net Gini measures are based on household market and disposable income per equivalent
household member, according to the 2011 income definition, adjusting income by the square root of the
household size. OECD figures are based on survey data and for some countries breaks in the series prevent
comparability over time. See OECD (2015) for more details.
5While mean income measured as GDP per capita or measured from survey means may significantly differ
(see e.g. Milanovic 2002), under our assumption of lognormality our estimates of the tax rate are independent
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With gross income x lognormally distributed, x ∼ LN(μ, σ 2), μ and σ can be estimated
using G and mean per capita income x¯. If the income distribution is lognormal, the Gini
only depends on the standard deviation parameter σ , according to G = 2(σ /
√
2) − 1,
where  represents the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution (see
Aitchison and Brown 1957: 13 and Chotikapanich et al. 1997: 536). For an observed Gini
G in a specific country and year:
σ = √2−1((G + 1)/2) . (10)
Additionally, for GDP per capita equal to x¯, the μ parameter of the country-specific
lognormal gross income distribution is given by:
μ = ln x¯ − σ 2/2 . (11)
In order to retrieve the distribution of disposable net income (y) on which net Gini (Gn)
is based, we make a distinction between the (minimal) required tax rate tg to finance public
goods g and the tax rate t − tg required to finance the per capita lump sum income transfer
c. One can think of tg as the required tax rate in case c = 0. For the mean income earner, it
must be the case that tgx¯ = g and (t − tg)x¯ = c. So y¯ = (1−t)x¯+c = (1−t)x¯+(t−tg)x¯ =
(1 − tg)x¯. This basically amounts to tax revenues used to provide public goods driving a
wedge between average gross and net income, while tax revenues used for redistribution,
the disbursement of c, do not. For tg we use country- and year-specific general government
final consumption expenditure as a fraction of GDP, taken from the World Bank (2015).6
Disposable net income is distributed according to y ∼ LN(μn, σ 2n ), where by applying
Eqs. 10 and 11 and using Gn and y¯ we can derive the parameters for σn and μn. The
values of these parameters are of course determined by the real, but unobserved, tax-and-
transfer systems in a country in a particular year that shaped the net income distribution.7 In
Appendix 1, given μ and σ,we derive the parameters σn and μn as a function of the tax rates
analytically. The correlation of the corresponding simulated net Gini and the real observed
net Gini from OECD (2015) is 0.993.
Under the assumption of a flat tax, lump sum transfer system, given the derived distri-
butions of gross and net income, we can estimate tˆ by making use of the properties of the
lognormal distribution. In a distribution regression function:8






1 − tˆ cˆ
(12)
of the mean. Differences between both measurements of mean income would play out in our estimates for
the (lump sum) government transfers, yet here these are only of secondary interest.
6This measure consists of ‘general government final consumption expenditure (formerly general government
consumption) includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (includ-
ing compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense and security, but
excludes government military expenditures that are part of government capital formation’ (World Bank
2015).
7For a non-linear tax schedule, Lubrano (2015: 23) remarks that it has been observed that in many countries
the tax schedule can be approximated by T (x) = x − axb , so disposable income y can be expressed as
y = x − T (x) = axb . A nice property of the lognormal distribution is that if x ∼ LN(μ, σ 2), then axb ∼
LN(bμ + ln a, b2σ 2), so disposable income is also lognormally distributed.
8Alternatively, Roemer et al. (2003: 553) using micro survey data run a regression y = a + bx, where
similarly the obtained regression coefficient b equals 1 − tˆ and coefficient a equals cˆ.
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Table 1 The lognormal distribution of gross income (x), wages (w) and optimal labour supply (L∗) and the
expressions of the median and mean values
x ∼ LN (μ, σ 2) w ∼ LN (μ, σ 2 / (1 + η)2) L∗ ∼ LN (0, [ησ / (1 + η)]2)
xm = eμ wm = xm = eμ L∗m = e0 = 1
x¯ = eμ+σ 2/2 w¯ = eμ+[σ / (1+η)]2/2 L¯∗ = e[ησ / (1+η)]2/2
Under t = tˆ , see Appendix 1 for distributions under alternative tax rates
The predicted tax rate tˆ is thus given by the following equation:




Var(x) = (eσ 2 − 1)e2μ+σ 2 (14)
and the covariance of two lognormally distributed variables:
Cov(x, y) = E (xy) − E (x)E (y) = eμ+μn+
(







We choose to set ρ = 1, which amounts to the simplifying assumption that the tax-and-
transfer system does not change the rank one has in the gross and net income distributions.9
Given y¯, x¯ and tˆ , cˆ follows from:
cˆ = y¯ − Cov(x, y)
Var(x)





Departing from the lognormal distribution of gross income, we can derive the distribu-
tions of wages, labour supply and the distribution of net income as a function of the tax
rate. In order to retrieve the wage distribution, and in line with Roemer et al. (2003: 549),
we first calibrate α so the labour supply Lm of the median earner is normalized to one, so
xm = Lmwm = wm. Using Eq. 2, this implies αˆ = (1 − tˆ )wm = (1 − tˆ )eμ.
























= [eημxi] 11+η . (17)
In general, if x ∼ LN(μ, σ 2) then axb ∼ LN(bμ + ln a, b2σ 2), so the distribu-
tion of wages is also lognormal since the RHS of Eq. 17 is of the form wi = axbi ,
with a = eημ/(1+η) and b = 1/(1 + η). The distribution of wages is then given by
w ∼ LN(μ, σ 2/ (1 + η)2). Analogously, again using Eq. 2 and the parameters of the log-
normal wage distribution, optimal labour supply10 under tˆ is lognormally distributed as
L∗ ∼ LN(0, [ησ / (1 + η)]2). Using the properties for the median and average of the log-
normal distribution, Table 1 summarizes mean and median levels of gross income, wages
and labour supply.
9This assumption is strong, as empirical work has shown in reality tax systems do re-rank households or
individuals (see e.g. Jenkins 1988; Aronson et al. 1994).
10Since median labour supply under tˆ is normalized to 1, if the tax rate is lowered, then median labour supply
is higher than 1.
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Table 2 Income levels and corresponding income and population shares of the median and average earner,
the ‘one dollar, one vote’ earner and the decisive voter
Variable Level Population share (p) Income share (s)
xm e
μ (0) = 0.5 (−σ)
x¯ eμ+σ 2/2 (σ/2) (−σ / 2)
Px e
μ+σ 2 (σ) (0) = 0.5
P e−ημwˆ1+ηD [(1 + η)(ln wˆD − μ) / σ ] [(1 + η)(ln wˆD − μ − σ 2) / σ ]
Py e
−ημwˆ′1+ηD [(1 + η)(ln wˆ′D − μ) / σ ] [(1 + η)(ln wˆ′D − μ − σ 2) / σ ]
p is the (abscissa) percentile position of the Lorenz curve on the horizontal axis, s is the (ordinate) percentile
position of the Lorenz curve on the vertical axis
One further simplification following from the lognormality assumption of gross and net
income is that by rewriting Eq. 5 the preferred tax rate by the median earner becomes a
function of the variance in gross income σ 2:
tm = 1 − e
σ 2/2
1 − (1 + η) eσ 2/2 . (18)
In general, the coordinates of points F (x) ;L(x) of the Lorenz curve generated
by a lognormal distribution of x ∼ LN(μ, σ 2) can be stated as ((ln x −
μ) / σ);((ln x − μ − σ 2) / σ). Using the parameters of the distribution ofw, the percentile
position in which the decisive gross (and net) wage earner wˆD sits (denoted by P) is then
given by its first coordinate:
P = 
(




Our index of the median voter deviation (MVD) relates the percentile position P of the
decisive voter wˆD in the income distribution to that of the median earner wm:
MVD = P − 0.5 . (20)
Figure 2 depicts a Lorenz curve diagram, using the parameters of the USA in 2012. If
the MVT were to hold, the decisive voter would be located in point M , with its abscissa
equal to 50 % (i.e., the median). We contrast it to our account of ‘one dollar, one vote’, in
which income determines the voting outcome. Our operationalization of ‘one dollar, one
vote’ differs from Karabarbounis (2011). In his account, since every dollar is a vote, an
increase in the income of any group of voters relative to the mean tilts redistributive taxes
closer to their preferred level. In our account, ‘one dollar, one vote’ entails that taxes are set
at the level preferred by the individual located around a share of half of total income. Thus
if ‘one dollar, one vote’ holds, then P would coincide with point Px , with its ordinate equal
to 50 %, where half of total income is earned by those below this point. Point A denotes the
location of the average earner, where the slope of the Lorenz curve is unity, so parallel to the
line of equality. Px is always located to the right of both M and A,M is always to the left
of A and the decisive myopic voter Py is always to the left of Px yet the location of M,A,
Py and Px relative to our estimation of the location of the decisive voter P is an empirical
question which we address below.
Table 2 gives the coordinates of these points M,A,Px, P and Py . The gross income
level of the median earner is equal to eμ. The income share s of all those earning up to the
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median income can be calculated using the formula for the incomplete first moment of the
lognormal distribution:∫ z
0
xf (x) dx = eμ+σ 2/ 2
(




so the income share is:
s (xm) =
∫ xm
0 xf (x) dx∫ ∞
0 xf (x) dx
=
∫ eμ









= (−σ) . (22)
The income share is equivalent to the ordinate of the Lorenz curve, that is, the per-
centile position on the vertical axis. The abscissa (p) of the median earner is by definition
0.5 or 50 %. In a similar way, the income and population shares for the income earners
A and Px can be derived. For the coordinates of the decisive voter P , its gross income is




)η = wˆ1+ηD e−ημ.11 Since the lognormal distribution has the
property that its corresponding Lorenz curve is symmetrical seen from the socalled ‘alter-
native diagonal’, the Lorenz asymmetry coefficient (Damgaard and Weiner 2000) defined
as the sum of the Lorenz curve abscissa and ordinate at the mean earner (see the second row
in Table 2) must be equal to 1.
To take stock, the assigned decisive voter according to the MVT is at the 50th percentile,
according to the ‘one dollar, one vote’ it is Px , based on the tax rate that aligns gross and
net Ginis it is P and the net income maximizing voter predicts Py . In the following section,
we will investigate the positioning of the various decisive voters identified into more detail.
4 Results
The position of the decisive voter in our method is of course dependent on the imposed wage
elasticity of labour supply η, which determines the labour supply disincentives of higher
taxation. In general, the higher the labour supply elasticity, the lower the tax revenues for
a given tax rate. We assume the labour supply elasticity is constant across time and across
countries. While this assumption is not unreasonable for men, where most studies find low
η-values that do not largely differ between countries, findings for females exhibit higher val-
ues and more cross country variation. We take the weighted mean of 205 estimates of wage
elasticity of labour supply for men and women in meta-regressions by Evers et al. (2008, see
especially their Tables 1 and 2 for the countries considered) based on studies of the uncom-
pensated wage elasticity for a large number of OECD countries, leading us throughout the
following analysis to present findings with η equal to 0.21. The online appendix elaborates
on the findings for different values of η.
Our method yields 320 country-year-specific values for P , Px and Py . For P , the two
extremes are Finland (P = 0.28 in 1994) and Chile (P = 0.68 in 2006), with the average
position of the decisive voter equal to 0.50 and an overall standard deviation of 0.07. As can
be noted from Table 3, the between-country variance (0.07) is about twice as high as the
within country variance (0.03). The largest within-country deviations occurred in Sweden,
Finland and Ireland. According to Table 3 and illustrated in Fig. 3, the position Py of the
11Using w1+η = xηmx¯, the gross income of the decisive voter as a function of the tax rate can be expressed
as xˆD = 1−tˆ (1+η)1−tˆ x¯.
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Table 3 Summary statistics for P, Py and Px
Mean SD Min Max
Py Overall 0.42 0.07 0.21 0.61
- Between 0.07
- Within 0.03
P Overall 0.50 0.07 0.28 0.68
- Between 0.07
- Within 0.03
Px Overall 0.81 0.03 0.73 0.87
- Between 0.03
- Within 0.01
Based on N = 320 country-year observations for 33 countries, so on average 10 year-observations per
country
‘myopic’ decisive voter maximizing net income is lower than P . This follows from the
comparison of Eqs. 7 and 9, which shows the wage and income level of the myopic income-
maximizing decisive voter wˆ
′
D(tˆ) will always lie below wˆD(tˆ). The position of Px , such that
50 % of total gross income is below that point, has a range of only 14 percentile points. Due
to lack of space to present results for all three percentile positions and since P sits nicely
between Py and Px , in what follows we will concentrate on P .
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for P for all OECD nations, showing the aver-
age decisive percentile P¯ for each country, with its respective standard deviations, minimum
and maximum and number of observations.
The MVT suggests that the median voter will be decisive in setting the tax rate.
Table 4 however suggests that the MVT does not consistently apply across OECD countries.














Fig. 3 Distribution of P , Py , and Px
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Table 4 Summary statistics for P by country
Mean SD Min Max N
Australia 0.56 0.01 0.54 0.57 6
Austriaa 0.47 0.01 0.46 0.49 9
Belgiuma 0.44 0.02 0.41 0.47 9
Canada 0.54 0.02 0.50 0.56 36
Chilea 0.68 0.00 0.68 0.68 3
Czech Republic 0.45 0.01 0.44 0.47 11
Denmark 0.41 0.02 0.36 0.44 11
Estonia 0.55 0.02 0.52 0.57 9
Finland 0.39 0.05 0.28 0.46 27
France 0.48 0.01 0.46 0.49 7
Germany 0.48 0.01 0.45 0.49 9
Greece 0.54 0.02 0.51 0.57 8
Iceland 0.49 0.03 0.44 0.54 9
Irelanda 0.48 0.05 0.41 0.55 9
Israel 0.55 0.04 0.48 0.59 9
Italy 0.54 0.01 0.52 0.56 10
Japan 0.57 0.01 0.56 0.58 6
Korea 0.58 0.00 0.58 0.58 7
Luxembourg 0.50 0.01 0.48 0.51 9
Netherlands 0.49 0.02 0.46 0.53 12
New Zealand 0.56 0.02 0.51 0.57 8
Norway 0.46 0.02 0.45 0.49 8
Polanda 0.54 0.02 0.53 0.58 9
Portugala 0.57 0.02 0.54 0.60 9
Russia 0.62 0.01 0.61 0.63 2
Slovakia 0.48 0.02 0.46 0.51 9
Slovenia 0.43 0.01 0.42 0.45 9
Spaina 0.56 0.01 0.55 0.57 9
Sweden 0.39 0.07 0.29 0.47 10
Switzerlanda 0.57 0.00 0.57 0.57 2
Turkey 0.63 0.00 0.63 0.63 2
United Kingdom 0.55 0.02 0.51 0.58 16
United States 0.60 0.01 0.57 0.61 11
aDenotes a break in the series occurred (see OECD 2015)
position, whereas in the Scandinavian countries it is well below the median. In a politi-
cal system in which ‘one dollar, one vote’ would rule, higher market income inequalities
would not be positively, but rather negatively associated with levels of taxation, implying
higher inequalities lead to lower elected tax rates. In terms of the Lorenz curve diagram
of Fig. 2, increasing inequality corresponds to an outward shift of the Lorenz curve and a
higher percentile position of Px , hence a lower elected tax rate.
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MVD
Fig. 4 Quadrant diagram with tˆ , median voter deviation (MVD) and gross Gini G, with dashed lines
indicating the relations under RRMR
Figure 4 allows us to study these associations, giving the relationship between the
MVD, the elected tax rate tˆ and gross income inequality measured by the Gini coeffi-
cient along four quadrants. The dashed lines depict the situation when MVT impeccably
holds. The bottom left quadrant depicts the relationship between gross income inequal-
ity and the elected tax rate and the best fitting line. Chile is a notable outlier, combining
high inequality with a low tax rate, while South Korea combines low inequality with
a low tax rate. The RRMR model predicts the elected tax rate to move in the direc-
tion of the revenue-maximizing tax rate (tmax) as gross income inequality is higher, i.e.
the larger the difference between the median earner and mean earner, the more there is
to gain for the median earner by voting for a higher tax rate. We find a positive rela-
tionship as expected, yet with a relatively low correlation (ρ = 0.39). While generally
nations with higher gross income inequalities face higher tax rates, the low correlation
implies that in some countries high income inequalities persist in the distribution of dis-
posable income as they are not met with higher tax rates and transfers. The explanation
for this weak association is to be found in the top left quadrant of Fig. 4, which shows
higher gross income inequalities are weakly associated with higher (and positive) median
voter deviations (ρ = 0.15). As indicated in the figure, Sweden and Finland are notable
outliers here.
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Finally, in the top right quadrant of Fig. 4 we find a strong negative association between
the MVD and tˆ , which in itself is not surprising, as the MVD is a function of P (see Eq. 20)
and P in turn is determined by tˆ . In states where the MVD is lower, the tax rate is closer
to the revenue-maximizing tax rate (ρ = −0.78). Within the class of countries marked by
a positive MVD, the variance is higher, so some countries do implement sizeable tax-and-
transfer programs, while others do not.
In sum, if the MVT holds impeccably, then a much stronger positive relationship between
market income inequality and the tax rate would be expected in the bottom left quadrant,
with the MVD in the top quadrants always equal to zero, indicated by the dashed lines.
The scatter plots in the upper quadrants illustrate that the MVD does not oscillate around
zero, which suggests deviations from RRMR, that is large variations from the expected
tax-and-transfer schemes. The RRMR framework thus seems unable to fully predict the
cushioning effect of taxation and redistribution, especially for nations with relatively high
market income inequality.
A second test of the RRMR model is provided by employing our model to simulate a
world in which the RRMR hypothesis would perfectly hold. If throughout the OECD, the
electoral systems did ensure political accountability towards the median voter, the decisive
voter would coincide with the median earner at the 50th percentile in the income distri-
bution, selecting tax rate tmwhich maximizes her utility. For any tm, we can simulate net
income inequality (see Appendix 1) and find the relationship between simulated net income
inequality under MVT and observed gross income inequality, both measured by Gini coeffi-
cients, as shown in Fig. 5. In the same figure we superimpose the observed net Ginis, which
thereby is indicative of the deviation of expected net income inequality under RRMR from
observed net inequality. The largest of such deviations for our sample of countries by far
are found in Chile (19 points on the Gini index), followed by Russia (10.5 points), Turkey
(10 points) the United States (between 6.5 and 4 points) and Israel (4.5 points). The range
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Fig. 5 Association between net Gini (simulated and observed) and market Gini
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This analysis makes clear three subsets of countries exist. A first subset is situated
below the expected net Gini under the MVT, consisting of among others the Scandina-
vian countries, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Belgium. The second subset aligns with
the expectation, including countries such as Australia and Canada on the one hand, and
Estonia and Poland on the other. For the final subset of countries, net income inequality
exceeds that expected under the RRMR framework, among others Turkey, Russia and the
United States.
Potentially, there are numerous factors that might explain the variation in the posi-
tion of the decisive voter relative to the median voter. We already noted that between
countries this variation is twice as large as within countries over time (see Table 1), so
it is natural to look for an explanation that focuses on differences between countries.
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to do a full-fledged investigation of fac-
tors relevant for the positioning of the decisive voter, we choose to evoke the seminal
work The Three Worlds of Capitalism by Esping-Andersen (1990) to see whether this
well-documented taxonomy of welfare states is borne out in our estimates. Welfare state
regimes each supplement the market economy with a legal framework extending social
rights to citizens, but in different ways. The ideal typical liberal welfare state champi-
ons economic growth and efficiency, designing its social programs so as to avoid work
disincentives and welfare dependency. The corporatist regime aims at social stability and
social integration (taken as the opposite of social exclusion), with occupational social
insurance as its predominant transfer program, focusing on the position of breadwin-
ners contingent on the occurrence of unemployment, disability and sickness. The social
democratic regime, finally, gives priority to minimizing poverty, income inequality and
unemployment, largely by means of tax-financed universal benefits and active labour market
policies.
In Fig. 6, we have pitched our measure of the MVD against the tax rate tˆ for the final
observed year to see if the type of welfare state matters. All liberal welfare states are indeed
situated at the right corner, combining relatively low tax rates with percentile positions P of
the decisive voter well above 50. All social democratic regimes are in the upper left corner,
combining high tax rates with values for P below the median. Corporatist welfare states
Germany, France and Austria are situated in between these liberal and social democratic
clusters, flanked by Italy and Spain on the right and Belgium on the left. Regarding tˆ , this
latter welfare state type resembles the social democratic type, yet on average at a MVD
closer to zero. Differences between these two types, in other words, largely play out on the
MVD axis.
Besides the type of welfare state, another natural candidate to explain the variation
in the position of the decisive voter is the phenomenon of skewed voter turnout, that is
voter turnout tends to increase with income. Larcinese (2007) tries to improve the per-
formance of the RRMR model by including voter turnout as an explanatory variable.
Larcinese (2007) shows that to explain social expenditures as a percentage of GDP, voting
turnout is positively significant whereas the ratio of median to mean income is insignificant.
Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005: 459) also find that voter turnout is positively signif-
icant to explain redistribution, leading them to speculatively state ‘the Meltzer-Richard
model accurately identifies the distribution of market income and voter turnout as key vari-
ables in the politics of redistribution’. Looking at Table 4, if the hypothesis that skewed
voter turnout shifts the effective median voter to the right in the income distribution
holds, then we expect the higher our estimate of the position of the decisive voter, the
more skewed voter turnout will be. For this analysis, ideally one requires voter turnout by
income decile.
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Fig. 6 The tax rate and median voter deviation for the three welfare state (WFS) types from Worlds of
Welfare
5 Conclusion
Recent rises in income and wealth inequality have led authors to question standing economic
models predicting higher inequality will be met with increased redistribution. While most
of these models evoke the MVT to ascertain the expected level of taxation, we set out to
empirically retrieve the position of the decisive voter based on the observed gross and net
Gini coefficients.
Combining data on gross and net income inequality and making a number of simplifying
assumptions – in particular that gross income is lognormally distributed, that redistribution
can be modelled as a flat tax-lump sum transfer, that voters choose their optimal tax rate and
that the labour supply elasticity is constant across countries and time – allows us to estimate
both the extent to which nations redistribute and the location of the decisive income earner.
Using the information of the Gini coefficients for the gross and net income distribution, we
find that on average the tax rate required to align the observed gross and net Gini coeffi-
cient is the tax rate that the median earner would prefer. This suggests that in the OECD,
on average, the decisive voter is the median voter. Our method can be used to identify the
decisive voter in non-OECD countries, as soon as reliable data becomes available for these
countries. Although the MVT on average holds for the OECD, within this group of demo-
cratic and economically developed nations, diffuse patterns continue to persist. We show
the taxonomy of welfare states into three types aligns with our findings.
Our method allows promising avenues for future efforts to study the relationship between
political institutions and inequality, both between countries and within countries over time.
We provide a framework in which better estimates of parameters, for example country- and
time-specific elasticities of labour supply, or lifting some of our assumptions, e.g. allow-
ing a non-linear tax-and-transfer scheme, can be included. Future work may also consider
different distributions beyond the lognormal, testing the robustness of our estimates of the
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positions of the decisive voters to different distributional assumptions, such as the Weibull,
Fisk or Gamma distributions.
Acknowledgments We are grateful for the comments by the referees and the editor, which helped us to
improve the paper considerably.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Inter-
national License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix 1: Derivation of the parameters for the lognormal distribution
of net income under different tax rates
Gross income x is the product of one’s wage rate and labour supply, given the tax rate tˆ in
place:






Median labour supply is normalized to one for the given tax rate tˆ . Wages are lognor-
mally distributed according to w ∼ LN (μ, σ 2 / (1 + η)2) (see Table 1). We can calculate
the distribution of gross wages under a different tax rate t ′, noting x then becomes a trans-





and b = 1+ η. This gives the
following distribution of x:
x ∼ LN(μ (1 + η) + ln
(
1 − t ′





If t ′ = tˆ , from Eq. 24 it then follows that x ∼ LN(μ, σ 2). In order to find the distribution
of net income y under t ′, we use the fact that the median net earner is the same individual
as the median gross earner, giving ym = (1 − t ′)xm + f − g. This can subsequently be
rewritten as










+σ 2/ 2 (25)
which, when solved for μn gives:
μn = μ (1 + η) + η ln
(
1 − t ′
(1 − tˆ )wm
)
+ ln [(1 − t ′) + (t ′ − tg)eσ 2/2] . (26)
In order to derive the variance parameter of the distribution of net income σ 2n , we use the
fact that (1 − tg)x¯ = y¯, which can be written as:





+σ 2/ 2 = eμn+σ 2n / 2 . (27)
Solving for σ 2n gives:
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Substitution of Eqs. 26 into 28 gives the following expression of σ 2n




(1 − t ′) + (t ′ − tg)eσ 2/ 2
]
− ln(1 − tg)
]
. (29)






− 1 . (30)
Using this method, the reconstituted net Gini Gn(tˆ) highly correlates with the observed
net Gini Gn (ρ = 0.993).
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